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FEDERAL TAX PROBLEMS
FEDERAL TAX PROBLEMS IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY*
Oliver W. Hammonds and George E. Ray**
INTRODUCTION
I N NO area of estate planning is the complexity of local law
more determinative factor than that pertaining to the dis-
position of community property. That complexity is doubly com-
pounded (if not confounded) when the impact of the federal
tax structure is correlated to the disposition of such property.
Basic, and prior, to an understanding of the intrinsic problems
pertaining to the disposition of community property is a complete
comprehension of the scope and nature of the community prop-
erty system. With that background, one can then begin intel-
ligently to comprehend the relation of that system to the federal
tax structure. Let us turn first, then, to a review of the com-
munity property system, a review which must at best be cursory.
I. THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM
Eight of our American states have the community property
system, which system originated with the Spanish settlements in
this country. Spain had the system in effect for many centuries.
The Roman law had no such system. In France it is first found
in the Napoleonic Code. The system was first introduced into
Louisiana territory by the Spanish and French colonizers.
The community property system was recognized by the terri-
tories acquired by the United States which were carved from the
*This article is a chapter in a book entitled "Basic Estate Planning," to be pub-
lished later in the year by Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana.
**The authors are partners in the firm of Ray and Hammonds, Dallas, Texas. Mr.
Ray took his A.B. and LL.B. degrees from Harvard University. Mr. Hammonds received
his A.B. from the University of Oklahoma and the LL.B. from Harvard University.
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former Spanish prosessions. Those property concepts were incor-
porated into their laws when those territories became states; in
some instances as a part of their constitutions, as in the cases of
California, Nevada and Texas. The system was "continued" after
statehood in California, Louisiana, New Mexico and Texas.' In
Arizona, Idaho, Nevada and Washington it was "adopted."
While the laws of no two states are precisely alike,2 and dif.
ferent theories of ownership have been noted within the frame-
work of the system,3 a number of broad generalizations may be
made. Community property law includes two classes of owner-
ship: (1) separate property, and (2) community property. The
first class includes property owned by each spouse at the time
of marriage and its income yield,4 and all acquisitions during
marriage by gift, devise, bequest or inheritance.' Community
property has been defined as all property other than separate
property. s Stated conversely, community property is composed
of earnings and acquisitions flowing from the economic activi-
ties of husband and wife, and the income and profits derived from
I For an excellent resum6 of the community property system of Texas, see Huie,
The Community Property Law of Texas, 13 VERNON'S TE.x. CIv. STAT. ANN. (1951) VII.
For a general, authoritative treatise discussion of the entire system throughout the United
States, see DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF'COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1943).
2 See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 208 et seq.; Daggett, The Mod-
ern Problem of the Nature of the Wfife's Interest in Community Property, 19 Calif.
L. Rev. 567 (1931); Labovitz, The Community Property System-Its Relation to
Income, Estate, and Inheritance Taxation, 9 Tax Mag. 286, 287 (1931).
3 See Evans, The Ownership of Community Property, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 47 (1921).
The author outlines four concepts: (1) California or single ownership theory; (2)
Washington or entity theory; (3) Idaho or double ownership theory; (4) Texas or
trust theory.
4 "The Spanish law which sent the fruits of separate property into the community has
been retained" in varying degree in the states of Texas, Idaho and Louisiana. 3 VER-
NIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 210. See also 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed.
1939) 239, 240.
5 3VERNiER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 209; Evans, The Ownership of Com-
munity Property, 35 Harv. L. Rev. (1921).
6 Evans, The Ownership of Community Property, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 47 (1921) ; Maggs,
Community Property and the Federal Income Tax, 14 Calif. L Rev. 351, 355 (1926).
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community property.7 Community ownership attaches only to the
marital status and dissolves upon the termination of that status.
The essential fact to be noted is that the fruits of the husband's
pursuit of gain constitute community property! It has been
stated, loosely perhaps, that "[c]ommunity property consists of
things in which substantial interests of two persons (husband and
wife) simultaneously exist and demand protection." 9 If divorced
the property rights of each are set off and lose their community
character.
At the death of the husband one-half of the community estate
becomes the separate property of the wife, and the other half is
subject to the testamentary disposition of the husband. In most
of the community property states the wife is similarly given a
right to dispose of one-half by will.1"
It has been observed that "community is a partnership which
begins only at its end,"' 1 that is, upon dissolution of the mar-
riage. This observation upon the realities of the system refers to
the actual position of the wife during coverture in comparison
with her formal co-ownership of the community wealth. During
the joint lives of the spouses the husband controls, manages and
7 See Hammonds v. Comm., 106 F. 2d 420, 422 (10th Cir. 1939). Cf. Powell, Com.
munity Property -A Critique of its Regulation of Intra-Family Relations, 11 Wash.
L. Rev. 12, 27 (1936). But see Beals v. Fontenot, 111 F. 2d 956 (5th Cir. 1940).
s Like all generalizations, this one also has its limitations. Property is not acquired
by the community unless the spouse making the acquisition has title or color of title.
The fruits of a husband's embezzlement may not be attributed to the community.
Estate of Thomas Spruance, 43 B.T.A. 221. Cf. Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 401-404, 247
S.W. 828, 832, 833 (1923) ; McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1925) c. 21. As to
the date of acquisition, compare Wrightsman v. Comm., 111 F. 2d 227 (5th Cir. 1940)
with Edwin C. F. Knowles, 40 B.T.A. 861 (1939).
9Powell, Community Property - A Critique of its Regulation of Intra-Family
Relations, 11 Wash. L. Rev. 12, 32 (1936).
10 Only Nevada and New Mexico discriminate against the wife in regard to a power
of testamentary disposition upon her prior death. See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS (1935) 221.
11 See Arnett v. Reade, 220 U. S. 311, 319 (1911). Ci. 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS (1935) 221, 226; Altman, Community Property; Avoiding Avoidance by Adop.
tion in the Revenue Act, 16 Tax Mag. 138, 140 (1938); Sebree, Federal Taxation of
Community Property, 12 Tex. L. Rev. 273, 280 (1934).
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disposes of the community property." This "nexus of powers""
is not regarded as contradicting the fact of community owner-
ship, for "the very foundation of the community and its efficaci-
ous existence depend on the power of the husband, during the
marriage, over the community, and his right, in the absence of
fraud or express legislative restriction, to deal with the com-
munity and its assets as the owner thereof.'
14
The only real limitation upon the husband's powers is that he
may not give the property away or dispose of it in fraud of his
wife's rights.'5 The restrictions have been more tightly drawn
with respect to real property, for generally the husband may not
convey such property or encumber it without the written consent
of his wife. 6 But the husband may dissipate the proceeds derived
from the sale of real property. 7
It seems to be generally established in all the community
states, with the exception of Washington and Arizona, that the
community property is liable for the husband's obligations."
The community property may be resorted to by creditors who
furnish necessaries to the wife, but this liability seems to derive
12 Garrozi v. Dastas, 204 U. S. 64 (1907) (nontax) ; Warburton v. White, 176 U. S.
484 (1900) (nontax). Cf. Arnett v. Reade, 220 U. S. 311 (1911) (nontax). See 3
VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 218.
13 Cf. Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F. 2d 929 (2d Cir. 1940).
14 Mr. Justice White, in Garrozi v. Dastas, 204 U. S. 64, 79 (1907) (nontax). Com-
pare the opinion of the same justice in Warburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484 (1900)
(nontax). See also Bek v. Miller, 8 F. 2d 797 (D. C. Cir. 1925).
15 There are a "variety of views" in regard to the husband's power to give away
community property. See Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life Insur-
ance, 18 Tex. L. Rev. 121 (1940). See also 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935)
219; Daggett, The Civil-Law Concept of the Wife's Position in the Family, 15 Ore. L.
Rev. 291, 298 (1936) ; Evans, The Ownership of Community Property, 35 Harv. L.
Rev. 47, 64 (1921). For a definition of fraud see Garrozi v. Dastas, 204 U. S. 64, 82(1907) (nontax). For an example of fraud see Moore v. California-Western States
Life Insurance Co., 67 S. W. 2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) er. dism.
16 See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 220; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY (3d ed. 1939) 243, 244. The husband's sole power over real property is still prac-
tically complete in Nevada, Texas and Louisiana.
17 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 220.
18 Id. at 223.
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from the husband's obligation of support.19 Despite limitations in
favor of the wife, the powers of management, control and dis-
position are still in the husband, and the wife's role is essen-
tially that of a back-seat driver who may carp and criticize but
may not take the wheel.20
The precise nature of the wife's interest under the community
system of shared ownership and unitary control has been a source
of considerable speculation, some fruitful and some otherwise.
Lawyers, like others, must work with categories. 1 It is not strange,
therefore, that the community has been compared to a partner-
ship, a trust, an estate by the entirety, an inchoate dower right,
and an heir's expectancy. It has been frankly concluded that the
wife's interest is sui generis, defying common law criteria.22 When
confronted with something alien to their way of thinking, lawyers
and judges, raised on common law terminology, have, as a way
out of their difficulties, seized upon the concepts of "vested inter-
est" and "expectancy" in order to deal with the wife's property
right. 3 It would appear to have made little difference which of
these two concepts was employed in describing the wife's inter-
est.24
It is not surprising that this dichotomy, which has prevailed
in the private law of community property, has been carried over
19 Ibid.
20 Cf. Daggett, The Modern Problem of the Nature of the Wife's Interest in Com-
munity Property, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 567, 600 (1931) ; Sebree, Federal Taxation of Com-
munity Property, 12 Tex. L. Rev. 273, 279 (1934).
21 Compare the debate between Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Roberts
in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435 (1940) (state tax).
22 See Daggett, The Modern Problem of the Nature of the Wife's Interest in Com-
munity Property, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 567, 572 (1931).
23 See Sampson v. Welch, 23 F. Supp. 271, 279 ( S. D. Calif. 1938) ; Bruton, The
Taxation of Family Income, 41 Yale L. J. 1172, 1173 (1932) ; Daggett, The Modern
Problem of the Nature of the Wife's Interest in Community Property, 19 Calif. L. Rev.
567, 573 (1931) ; Hooker, Nature of Wife's Interest in Community Property in Cali-
fornia, 15 Calif. L. Rev. 302 (1927).
24 See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 234, 235; cf. Note, 39 Harv. L.
Rev. 762, 764 (1926). But see Kirkwood, The Ownership of Community Property in
California, 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 1, 4-6 (1933).
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into the federal law of estate and gift tax, as well as the income
tax. These revenue measures were constructed entirely upon a
common law system of ownership, and no consideration was
25given to the community property system.
II. THE FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAX TREATMENT
OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Having had the benefit of the foregoing general, but neverthe-
less necessary, background and nature of the community prop-
erty system, let us take a further general look at the treatment
accorded community property under the federal income, estate,
and gift tax structure.
A. The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Community Property.
1. Income Problems.
In community property jurisdiction, consistent with the con-
cepts of property ownership set forth above, one-half of the
income which belongs to the marital community is taxable to
each spouse, whether such income is derived from the personal
services 6f one of them, or from the community property. Accord-
ingly, each spouse may report his or her share of the community
income on his or her separate return. 6
The principal problem, therefore, is to determine what is com-
munity and what is separate property. Although, as noted above,
certain general principles are applicable to community property
in all eight states, the results in specific cases may differ sub-
25 CI. Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income, 41 Yale L. J. 1172 (1932). This
statement certainly seems indisputable so far as the original enactment of the estate
tax is concerned. The statement seems to be equally correct with respect to later acts,
which failed to circumvent difficulties posed by the community property system and
judicial interpretation. Congress' failure to act hardly indicates that it reenacted the
estate tax with community property complications in mind. Cf. Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U. S. 106, 120 (1940), rehearing pursuant to Supreme Court mandate, 111 F. 2d
143 (6th Cir. 1940).
26 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101; Goodell v. Koch, 282 U. S. 118; Hopkins v.
Bacon, 282 U. S. 122; Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U. S. 127; all decided in 1930.
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stantially. Since property rights under local law are the determi-
native factor, the result in one jurisdiction should be transposed
cautiously to a problem in another. Let us turn now to a general
resum6 of some of the principal, recurring problems in the
income tax field.
The burden of proving the community ownership of property
normally rests upon the taxpayer.27 Where, however, separate
and community properties are commingled, a presumption under
local law that the entire property belongs to the community is suf-
ficient to overcome the contrary determination of the Commis-
sioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.2"
The taxability of income generally depends upon the owner-
ship of that income at the time it is realized. However, where
compensation is earned prior to domicile in a community prop-
erty state, the earning spouse is separately taxable therefor al-
though the compensation was not definitely ascertained or paid
until after such domicile was acquired.29
Where a taxpayer domiciled in a community state changes his
status by marriage during a taxable year of a partnership, he
may not treat his entire distributive income from the partnership
for that year as community income. Moreover, apportionment
on a time basis is not permitted where the actual earnings before
and after marriage can be ascertained."0
The law of the situs of the property determines whether
27 See Johnson v. Com'r, 105 F. 2d 454 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 625
(1940).
28 McFadden v. Com'r, 148 F. 2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945) ; cf. dictum in W. D. John-
son, 1 T. C. 1041 (1943), app. dism., 139 F. 2d 491 (8th Cir. 1943). See also Com'r
v. Fleming, 155 F. 2d 204 (5th Cir. 1946); Emma Frye Estate, 44 B.T.A. 835 (1941).
29 Wrightsman v. Com'r, 111 F. 2d 227 (5th Cir. 1940) ; Howard Veit, 8 T. C. 809
(1947). For a general discussion of problems resulting from change of domicile from
common law to community property jurisdictions, see Ray and Hammonds, Change of
Domicile, 1947 Taxes 891.
sOKemp S. Dargan, 6 CCH T. C. MEM. DEc. 1078 (1947). Cf. § 51, INT. REV.
CODE, providing that husband and wife married on December 31 may split their income
for the entire year by filing a joint return.
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income from real property is community income."' Thus, even
where the property was acquired by one spouse as compensation
for personal services, income from property situated in a com-
munity state is divided between a husband and wife domiciled
in a non-community state.8 2 The same rule was applied in a
case where, apparently, the income from property situated in
a community state was divided only because of an agreement to
that effect between the husband and wife.38
The ownership of income from property is generally depend.
ent upon whether the property is owned separately or by the com-
munity, whether governed by the law of the situs or by the law
of the domicile. Where the property is separately owned by one
spouse (as in the case of a non-community state, or acquired by
gift, devise or descent), the general rule is that the income from
such property is separate income.84
An allocation is -required if income is attributable partly to
separate property and partly to personal services. Thus it was
held, in the case of a sole proprietorship business owned by the
husband, for which business he rendered personal service, that
income from capital equaled 7 per cent of capital, and that the
balance of the income belonged to the community.8"
In cases where one spouse is a member of a partnership, a
more complex formula has been applied. The portions of total
income attributable to capital and to personal services are deter-
mined by allocating such income in the ratio which a fair return
on capital bears to a reasonable compensation for services. 6
31 Com'r v. Skaggs, 122 F. 2d 721 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U. S. 811
(1942).
32 Hammonds v. Com'r, 106 F. 2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939) ; cl. Noble v. Com'r, 138
F. 2d 444 (10th Cir. 1943).
33 Black v. Com'r, 114 F. 2d 355 (9th Cir. 1940).
34 See Shea v. Com'r, 81 F. 2d 937 (9th Cir. 1936); Otto S. Grunbaum, 44 B.T.A.
810 (1941) ; W. L. Honnold, 36 B.T.A. 1190 (1937).
85 Lawrence Oliver, 4 T. C. 684 (1945); see Ashley Manning, 8 T. C. 537 (1947).
36 Clara B. Parker, 31 B.T.A. 644 (1934); J. Z. Todd, 3 T. C. 643 (1944), remanded,
153 F. 2d 553 (9th Cir. 1945), on remand, 7 T. C. 399 (1946), aff'd, 165 F. 2d 781
(9th Cir. 1948) ; see I. T. 3890, 1948-1 CuM. BULL. 52.
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The value of corporate stock originally owned by the husband
was held partly allocable to the community, such part being the
portion of the stock's present value attributable to the husband's
services to the corporation for which he had not otherwise been
adequately compensated. 7
Where oil lease income would ordinarily be the husband's
separate income by reason of his separate ownership, part of
the income may nevertheless be allocated to the community by
reason of his personal services.3 Income in excess of fair rental
value derived from farming on the husband's separate property
has similarly been held community income."
In Texas the general rule applies to "increase" of the property
not attributable to the time and efforts of the spouse during mar-
riage. Gain on the sale of separately owned real estate is thus
normally separate income.40 Similarly, as to the sale of separately
owned securities.41 Oil royalties and bonuses are regarded as a
removal and disposition of the contents of the soil; such income
derived from separate property is therefore separate income.4
This rule applies even where such income is derived through a
trust or partnership. It applies also to distributable income
consisting of gain on trust corpus, if that corpus is classifiable as
separate property.4
On the other hand, rents, crops, increase in cattle, and other
s Guy C. Earl, 4 T. C. 768 (1945) ; G. A. Axelson, 1942 CCH B.T.A. MEM. DEC.
No. 12,500-B, P-H 1942 B.T.A. & T. C. MEM. DEC. 42,216.
38Trapp v. U. S., 177 F. 2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 913 (1950)
(Tex.).
39 C. Clifford Minnick, 14 T. C. 8 (1950) (Wash.); followed, G.C.M. 26535, 1950-2
CUM. BULL. 31.
40 McFaddin v. Com'r, 148 F. 2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945).
41 O'Connor v. Com'r, 110 F. 2d 652 (5th Cir. 1940).
42 Com'r v. Wilson, 76 F. 2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935).
4s Welder v. Com'r, 148 F. 2d 583 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Crabb v. Com'r, 136 F. 2d 501
(5th Cir. 1943) ; Com'r v. Wilson, supra note 42.
44 McFadden v. Com'r, cited supra note 40.
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ordinary income derived from separate property are community
income.45 Income of a spendthrift trust actually distributed to
a Texas beneficiary is community income, in the absence of a
clearly expressed intent by the grantor to make it separate in-
come.
46
In Louisiana, "fruits" of separate property belong to the com-
munity. This includes "civil fruits" such as interest, dividends,
and rents. It does not, however, include all "profits." Therefore,
oil royalties and bonuses received by a lessor upon the lease of
his separate property are separate income. 47 .Trust income belongs
to the community where one spouse is the trustee as well as the
beneficiary."'
In Louisiana, the fruits of the wife's paraphernal property
belong to the community if the property is managed by the hus-
band.49 Under a 1944 legislative amendment, the income from
even the wife's separately managed property is community income
unless she records an instrument preserving her separate rights.5"
As in the case of the husband's separate property, however, this
rule apparently does not apply to other "profits."'" Even in the
case of fruits, however, the parties may by antenuptial contract
provide that management shall not affect the separate status of
income.52
Where the husband and wife agree that their respective incomes
shall be owned separately, and where the state law (as in Arizona,
45 Com'r v. Skaggs, cited supra note 31; Com'r v. Wilson, cited supra note 42.
46 Com'r v. Porter, 148 F. 2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Ernest Hinds Estate, 11 T. C.
314 (1948), aff'd on other grounds,'180 F. 2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950).
47 U. S. v. Harang, 165 F. 2d 106 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Com'r v. Gray, 159 F. 2d 834
(5th Cir. 1947), rev'g 5 T. C. 290 (1945).
48 U. S. v. Burglass, 172 F. 2d 960 (5th Cir. 1949).
49 Melanie D. Marks, 8 T. C. 1255 (1947) ; Helen E. Hyman, 46 B.T.A. 992 (1942),
aft'd, 135 F. 2d 49 (5th Cir. 1943) ; G.C.M. 23798, 1943 CuM. BULL. 1049.
50 U. S. v. Burglass, cited supra note 48.
51 See Com'r v. Gray, cited supra note 47; Hebert v. U. S., 68 F. Supp. 230 (E. D.
La. 1946), rev'd per stipulation, 38 AM. FED. TAX. REP. 1568 (5th Cir. 1947).




California, Texas and Washington.) recognizes the validity of
such an agreement, the entire income earned by one spouse, as
well as the income from his separately owned property, is tax-
able to him.58 Conversely, separately owned property may be
converted into community property where the state law recognizes
the rights created by such an agreement.54
If income has been earned as community property, one-half of
such income is taxable to each spouse on a cash basis when it is
received, even though the parties have agreed in the interim that
all income is to be separate property.55 If the parties substitute
an assignment of part of the husband's income for the wife's
community right, the entire income is taxable to the husband.5"
It has been held, however, under California law that a partner
ship agreement entered into by the husband and wife with others
does not transmute community property into separate property. 57
An agreement converting existing community property to the
separate ownership of one spouse is recognized under Texas law.
Future income from such property is, therefore, governed by the
Texas rules applicable to income from separate property. On
the other hand, an agreement which purports to vest future
income in one spouse (except as such vesting may be accom-
plished by the transfer of existing property) is invalid; such
income therefore continues to be divided between the spouses.5"
Where the wife's share of community property is placed in trust
53 Van Every v. Com'r, 108 F. 2d 650 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 689
(1940) ; Woodall v. Com'r, 105 F. 2d 474 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 655
(1940). Helvering v. Hickman, 70 F. 2d 985 (9th Cir. 1934).
54 J. Harold Dollar Estate, 41 B.T.A. 869 (1940) (Calif.) ; E. C. Olson, 10 T. C.
458 (1948) (Wash.).
55 Johnson v. U. S., 135 F. 2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).
56 Van Every v. Com'r, cited supra note 53; F. Eldred Boland, 41 B.T.A. 930 (1940),
aff'd, 118 F. 2d 622 (9th Cir. 1941); cf. C. A. Hawkins, 6 CCH T.C. MEM. DEC. 1087
(1947).
5 George W. Van Vorst, 7 T. C. 826 (1946) ; G. C. M. 25642, 1948-1 CuM. BULL. 57.
58 Mellie E. Stewart, 35 B.T.A. 406 (1937), aff'd, 95 F. 2d 821 (5th Cir. 1938);
G.C.M. 20960, 1939-2 CuM. BULL. 175.
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pursuant to a separation agreement, the income is not that of an
"alimony trust" taxable to the husband.59
If the husband and wife should agree upon an unequal division
of community property, gain may be realized by the spouse who
derives the advantage." Presumably, however, the corresponding
loss to the other spouse would not qualify as a loss "incurred in
a transaction entered into for profit." Where one spouse "pur-
chases" the other's community interest for less than value, his
basis upon a subsequent sale is the purchase price, not the cost
to the community.61 Conversely, the husband may increase the
basis of his property by the amount paid out of his separate
funds in a divorce settlement to obtain a release of the wife's
community interest in the property.6"
If there has been a termination of the community statrs by
divorce, a subsequent decree vacating the divorce decree does
not reconvert the husband's separately owned interim income
into community income.6" Where, however, an interlocutory de-
cree of divorce does not terminate the community, one-half of
the community income is still taxable to each spouse. 4
2. Deduction Problems.
Deductions connected with community property are generally
divided between husband and wife.65 This is true even with respect
to separately owned property which produces community income.66
Where, however, one spouse is separately liable for taxes, interest
and attorneys' fees incurred in connection with separately owned
59 Howard S. Dudley, 39 B.T.A. 1170 (1939) ; Ernestine Mitchell, 38 B.T.A. 1336
(1938).
60 Johnson v. U. S., 135 F. 2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).
61 C. C. Rouse, 6 T. C. 908 (1946), afJ'd, 159 F. 2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
62 Long v. Com'r, 173 F. 2d 471 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 818 (1949).63 James E. West, 44 B.T.A. 1159 (1941), afl'd, 131 F. 2d 46 (9th Cir. 1942).
6 4 Ethel B. Dunn, 3 T. C. 319 (1944).
65 Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1940).
66 Stewart v. Com'r, 95 F. 2d 821 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Catherine F. Wagoner, 7 CCH
T. C. MEM. DEC. 130, P-H 1948 B.T.A. & T. C. MEM. DEC. ff 48,029,
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property, he or she is entitled to the entire deduction where there
is an offsetting community income from that property during the
taxable year.67
The entire deduction for expenses paid out of his separate
funds may be taken by one spouse, even if they benefit the other
spouse. This rule is applicable to medical expenses. Where, how-
ever, the payment is from commingled funds, it is presumed that
the expenses are those of the community, and the deduction must
be divided. Charitable contributions, on the other hand, are
deductible by the payor in the absence of a consent by the other
spouse to the contribution.6" Alimony paid to the husband's for-
mer wife has been held to be collectible out of community funds
and therefore divisible as a deduction.69
The loss from a claim arising against the husband while domi-
ciled in a non-community state is deductible only by the hus-
band, although the loss was not "incurred" until after he acquired
a domicile in a community state.7" Although a husband is allowed
to deduct the cost of litigating his right to report income on a
community basis, his wife may not deduct her share of the ex-
pense where the income in the prior year was that of husband
and a former wife.
Under California law the husband is equally and primarily
liable for state income tax due on the wife's return. Where he
paid the entire tax, he was held entitled to the entire deduction.72
3. Special Income Tax Problems Involved in the Administration
of Estates in Community Property States.
As has been previously noted, during the marital status income
67 Irma J. Hunt, 47 B.T.A. 829 (1942).
6SErnest W. Clemens, 8 T. C. 121 (1947), app. dism. (5th Cir. 1949).
69Robert A. Sharon, 10 T. C. 1177 (1948), remanded per stipulation, 1949 P-H
FED. TAX. SERV. 71,128 (5th Cir. 194-9); see Godchaux v. U. S., 102 F. Supp. 266
(E. D. La. 1952).
70 Lottie Zukor, 43 B.T.A. 825 (1941).
71 Herbert Marshall, 5 T. C. 1032 (1945).72 A1 Jolson, 3 T. C. 1184 (1944).
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derived from community property is community income, taxable
one-half to each spouse, and the deductions from such income
are community deductions, equally divisible. When, however, one
of the parties to the marriage dies, and the estate of the deceased
spouse is in process of administration, it is then important to know
the particular rules applying to the taxation of the income derived
from their erstwhile community property. The problem then is
as to the income tax treatment of income earned or produced
from that community property after the death of one of the
spouses and during the period of administration of that spouse's
estate.78
Some of the income tax problems presented for consideration
during this period of administration are: how and to whom the
income from the community property of the deceased spouse is
to be taxed; determination of the basis of that property for the
purpose of gain or loss, depreciation and depletion; and the
-proper handling of administration and like expenses.74
Treatment of Income During the Period of Administration.
The pertinent statutory provision with regard to the income
tax treatment of the community property of one of the deceased
parties to the community partnership is Section 161 of the Internal
Revenue Code. It reads as follows:
"(a) Application of tax. The taxes imposed by this chapter upon
73 Excluded from present consideration is the treatment of community income
earned or accrued prior to the death of one of the spouses (see Com'r v. King, 69 F.
2d 639 (5th Cir. 1934), and see also INT. REV. CODE § 126), and where either there
has been no administration or such has been concluded, attention here being confined
only to the relationship between the property of the surviving spouse and that of the
deceased spouse during the period of administration.
74 See also Brookes, The Tax Consequences of Widows' Elections in Community
Property States, 1951 MAJOR TAX PROBLEMS (Proceedings of the Tax Institute, Univ.
of So. Calif. School of Law) 83.
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individuals shall apply to the income of estates or of any kind of
property held in trust, including-
(3) Income received by estates of deceased persons during the
period of administration or settlement of the estate....
The question which arises under this Section with regard to
community property is the meaning of the phrase, "estates of
deceased persons." If this phrase is synonymous with the phrase
"gross estate," as used in the federal estate tax provision, it is
clear, under the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1948, that the
taxable estate for income tax purposes during the period of admin-
istration would include only the decedent's separate property,
plus his share of the community property.7" Stated differently,
the taxable estate of the deceased spouse for income tax purposes
would include only property owned by him under the local laws
of the several community property states. For simplicity, inclu-
sion only of such property within the taxable estate is referred
to as that falling under the "ownership of property" rule. Corol-
lary thereto, it would readily appear that income received by the
surviving spouse from his or her share of the community prop-
erty would not be taxable to the "estate" of the decedent spouse
for income tax purposes.
Unfortunately, however, due to the nature of the community
property system, particularly in relation to the administrative
handling of community property estates, the solution has not been
so simple. Under the community system as developed above,7 6
the survivor's share of the community is administered together
with the deceased's share in the community.
The question therefore arises as to whether "estates of deceased
persons," as used in Section 161(a) (3) of the Internal Revenue
Code, is intended to include therein for income tax purposes not
7' See below at p. 148.
o See also Huie, The Powers and Liabilities of a Qualified Community Survivor,
15 Dallas Bar Speaks 275 (.1952).
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only the property owned by the decedent, but, to the extent the
property of the surviving spouse is subjected to administration
along therewith, also the survivor's share therein "during the
period of administration or settlement of the estate." Again, for
purposes of simplicity, this interpretation of the possible statu-
tory scope is referred to as the "administration of property rule."
Corollary to this interpretation of the statute is the resulting exclu-
sion from taxation to the surviving spouse of any part of the
income from the community property in administration, as such.
Instead, the survivor would be considered taxable only on amounts
in fact "distributed currently" to him77 or amounts "properly
paid or credited" to him or her.7"
The statutory provision in question has in fact received the
benefit of both of the interpretations just discussed from the
Treasury and the courts. At the outset, the Tax Court" and the
Bureau"0 followed the "ownership of property" rule and held
that the estate of the decedent and the surviving spouse were each
taxable on one-half of the income derived from the community
property. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit then upset
this result in a Texas case where the husband died first, leaving
independent executors to administer his estate."' The court's hold-
ing, in effect, required the taxation of the entire income during
administration to the estate of the deceased husband, the wife
being taxed only on amounts actually distributed to her. 2 This
last holding was followed by the Commissioner and the Tax
Court 3 until both were reversed by circuit court decisions.8 4 As
7 7 
INT. REV. CODE § 162(b).
78 INT. REv. CODE § 162(c).
71 J. R. Brewer, Administrator, 17 B.T.A. 704 (1929) (Tex.).
80 Estate of Bartlett, 21 B.T.A. 751 (1930) (Calif.), acquiesced in, X-2 CUM. BULL. 5.
81 Barbour v. Commissioner, 89 F. 2d 474 (1937).
82 See Clara Wilson, 2 CCH T. C. MEm. DEC. 946 (1943).
s3 Stella Wheelor Bishop, 4 T. C. 588 (1945) (Calif.) ; Estate of Hunt Henderson,
2 CCH T. C. MEM. DEC. 1092 (1943).
s4 Henderson's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F. 2d 310 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Bishop v.
Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 389 (9th Cir. 1945).
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a result, it now appears settled that the "ownership of property
rule" rather than the "administration" rule is to prevail and
that the decedent's estate and the surviving spouse will be taxed
accordingly on community income during the period of admin-
istration. 5
Basis Problems Arising During the Period of Administration
The problem of the basis of community property for determin-
ing gain or loss, or depreciation, or depletion during the period
of administration is closely related to that of the treatment of
the income from such property just discussed. Again the basic
question is the determination of what part of the community
property is subject to application of the federal taxing statute,
which in the case of basis is governed by Section 113(a) (5) of
the Internal Revenue Code.
Section 113(a) (5) provides in pertinent part:
If the property was acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance, or
by the decedent's estate from the decedent, the basis shall be the fair
market value of such property at the time of such acquisition.
Here, in contrast with Section 161(a) (3) above, the use of the
qualifying phrase "by the decedent's estate from the decedent"
(italics supplied) has made it fairly clear that the property sub-
ject to basis adjustment is only that of the decedent himself and
not also that of the surviving spouse. And, until the Revenue
Act of 1948, the Commissioner uniformly held, with the excep-
tion of California property,8 6 that Section 113(a) (5) applied only
to the decedent's half of the community property and not the
survivor's half, the latter's basis being cost. Section 366(a) of
the Revenue Act of 1948, however, amended Section 113(a) (5)
of the Internal Revenue Code to provide that the basis of the
s5G.C.M. 25008, 1946-2 CuM.. BULL. 49; Blackburn's Estate v. Com'r, 180 F. 2d
952 (5th Cir. 1950).
s6See G.C.M. 24292, 1944 Cum. BULL. 162.
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one-half share in the community of the surviving spouse should
be its fair market value at the applicable valuation date, if there
was included in the determination of the value of the decedent's
gross estate at least one-half of the whole of the community prop-
erty. Currently, therefore, the basis of the entire community prop-
erty of both spouses is fair market value at the applicable valu-
ation date.
8 7
Deduction Problems Arising During the Period of Administration
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code provides in pertinent
part:
The net income of the estate or trust shall be computed in the
same manner and on the same basis as in the case of an individ-
ual....
The "estate" referred to above in Section 162 is the same
"estate" as referred to in Section 161(a), discussed above, which
imposes the tax on estate income. Accordingly, it is clear that
deductions of the estate are to offset income of the estate. There-
fore, if the entire income from the community property is con-
sidered taxable to the estate, the latter is entitled to offset that
income in determining its net income by deducting all deductions
chargeable against that community property. If, on the other
hand, only the income from the decedent's half of the community
property is taxable to the estate, as discussed above, then it has
the benefit of only one-half of the community deductions in off-
setting that income.88
Except for administration expenses and losses incurred during
the settlement of estates of the kind covered in Section 23(e) of
87 The community property rules of Nevada and New Mexico may preclude this
result in certain circumstances in the case of the wife's prior death. 2 Nv.. COMP. L.
1929 (1931-1941 Supp.) § 3395.01; N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. § 38-104. Similarly with regard
to certain California property acquired by the community prior to April 16, 1923.
Sen. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), 1948 CuM. BULL. 285, 351.




of the Internal Revenue Code, casualty losses, there is no rela-
tion between income deductions of the estate, just discussed, and
deductions of the estate for determining the taxable estate for
estate tax purposes under Section 812(b) of the Code, a separate
problem. These two items, however, may only be deducted in either
the estate tax return or the income tax return of the estate, but
not the returns of both.
The extent to which administration expenses and uninsured
casualty losses are deductible varies in the individual community
property states. Thus, in some of the states only one-half of the
executors' commissions and attorneys' fees are deductible in the
estate tax return, whereas they are deductible in full in the income
tax return of the estate. Accordingly, special consideration must
be given to which return these particular items will be deducted on.
B. The Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Community Property.
The estate and gift tax treatment of community property under
federal law has had a complex history culminating in the Rev-
enue Act of 1948.9 The primary purpose of the estate and gift
tax provisions of that Act were, briefly, to equalize the tax bur-
dens as between residents of the community and non-community
property jurisdictions.
Initially, the basic difficulty arose from the fact that in a com-
munity property state, as previously noted, the entire community
property of a married couple is considered to be owned one-half
by each spouse, whereas in the non-community property states
most of the property is generally in the name of one spouse, the
husband.
Prior to 1942, the federal tax structure took into account this
89 For a discussion of some of the pertinent inheritance tax problems, as distin-
guished from federal estate tax problems, arising in a particular community property
jurisdiction, and on which the scope of this work does not permit any detailed con-
sideration, see Triplett, Selected Inheritance Tax Problems in California, 1950 MAJOR




division of ownership in community property and on the death
of one of the spouses subjected to estate tax only that spouse's
one-half of the community property. In the case of a gift of com-
munity property, only one-half was taxed to each spouse. In the
non-community property states, when the husband died, most,
if not all, of the family holdings were subjected to estate tax.
Gifts were generally made by the husband from his own property,
and therefore were all taxed to him.
In 1942, however, Congress sought to remove the presumed
tax advantages of the residents of the community property states
by providing that on the death of the spouse first to die all of the
community property should be subject to estate tax, except to
the extent that it could be shown that the community property
was derived from the separate property of, or from personal serv-
ices actually rendered by, the surviving spouse." It was also pro-
vided that in any event there would be included in the taxable
estate the one-half of the community property over which the
deceased spouse had the power of testamentary disposition. The
proceeds of life insurance on the decedent's life, where the pre-
miums had been paid out of community property, were to be
included in the taxable estate of the decedent. With respect to
the gift tax, all gifts of community property were to be taxed to
the husband, except to the extent that it could be shown the prop-
erty was derived from the separate property of, or from personal
services rendered by, the surviving spouse.
It soon became evident to the citizens of the community prop-
erty states that the 1942 statutory changes, while eliminating the
prior advantages of the residents of community property states,
had now resulted in new and distinct disadvantages to them fully
as great in magnitude as their former advantages. Among these
disadvantages were the following:
90 For a general discussion of the background of the 1942 Revenue Act, see Ray,
Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation of Community Property: Income Tax, 30
Calif. L. Rev. 397, 527 (1942).
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(1) In many cases the 1942 provisions resulted in double
taxation.
(2) They also imposed a virtually impossible burden of trac-
ing the community property derived from the separate property
or earnings of the surviving spouse.
(3) Where the surviving spouse later sold property of the
community which had increased in value, the Treasury Depart-
ment held91 that as to Texas community property the basis of the
surviving spouse's half, as distinguished from that derived from
the decedent spouse, was one-half of the original cost basis of
the property to the community, rather than one-half of the value
at the date of the decedent's death.
(4) It was not at all clear from the statute that if, after the
death of one spouse, the surviving spouse died within five years,
Section 812(c) of the Code, relieving from estate tax property
previously taxed within the last five years, would apply. Although
the Treasury took the position that the provision did apply, 2
there was nothing to prevent it from changing its opinion.
(5) Congress had not seen fit to decide how the estate tax
burden should be borne as between the decedent's portion of the
community property and that of the survivor; and the Supreme
Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the 1942 estate tax
provisions,9" skirted that as a problem for the states. In states such
as Texas, where there was no rule for this situation, it was neces-
sary to adopt statutory provisions for apportioning the burden
of the estate tax between the decedent's and the survivor's portions
of the community property. The rule adopted in Texas imposed
the burden on the decedent's estate to the extent of all the tax,
except for one-half of what the tax would have been had the com-
91 1. T. 3808, 1946-2 CUM. BULL. 58.
92 U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.41.
93 Fernandez v. Weiner, 326 U. S. 340 (1945) ; U. S. v. Rompel, 326 U. S. 367 (1945).
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munity property been the only property of the spouses subject
to tax.
(6) One more difficulty lay in the fact that Congress, in
providing that community property should be taxed as the prop-
erty of the spouse first to die, had failed, in both the statute and
the committee reports, to provide any rule in case of simultaneous
death of both spouses.
With the adoption of a split-income rule for all states in the
Revenue Act of 1948, it soon became evident that the only fair
rule would be to repeal the 1942 estate and gift tax provisions.
But it was also apparent that if this were done, the situation would
result in a restoration of the pre-19 4 2 advantage of community
property. The answer to the equalization problem was finally
determined by two principal steps: (1) repealing the 1942 estate
tax provisions, with respect to community property; and (2) pro-
viding, with respect to non-community property, a "marital deduc-
tion" which, for estate tax purposes, would put non-community
and community property on the same basis. Thus the mountain
moved to Mohammed. And judging from the complexity of the
"marital deduction" provisions and the length of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee's explanation of them, it was truly a mountain
that moved.
The restoration of community property to its pre-1942 status,
for estate tax purposes, was effected by the repeal 9 of three spe-
cific provisions of the estate tax law which had been introduced
into the Code in 1942, dealing with community property law.
With the repeal of these provisions, the status of the interest of
a decedent, for computing the gross estate under Section 811 of
the Code, was made determinable under the local state law.
The 1942 provisions repealed by the 1948 Act were: (1) Sec-
tion 811(e) (2) of the Code, which provided generally that all
94 Revenue Act of 1948, § 351.
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community property should be included in the estate of the spouse
first to die except where it could be traced to the separate prop-
ery or earnings of the survivor; (2) Section 811(d)(5), which
included in the estate of the decedent first to die transfers of
community property made in contemplation of death, transfers
intended to take effect at or after death and transfers to revocable
trusts, or transfers where the decedent retained rights in the prop-
erty or income therefrom; and (3) Section 811(g)(4), which
included in the taxable estate the proceeds of insurance on the
decedent's life purchased with community property.
The repeal of these three provisions was, however, made effec-
tive beginning only with January 1, 1948, rather than retroactive
to the effective date of the 1942 Act. The community property
included in the estates of taxpayers dying between the effective
date of the 1942 Act, October 21, 1942, and January 1, 1948,
must, therefore, still bear the burden of the 1942 estate tax pro-
visions.95 The new Act further provided96 that the retroactive appli-
cation of the repeal of the community property provisions should
not increase the estate tax which would have been payable under
the old law where the decedent died in 1948, but before enact-
ment of the new Act.
In addition to the repeal of the above provisions of the 1942
Act with respect to community property, Congress adopted a new
specific provision,97 as noted above, amending Section 113(a) (5)
of the Code to allow the surviving spouse to use as a basis for
the survivor's half of the community property the fair market
value of the property at the date of death of the decedent spouse,
or at the optional valuation date a year after the date of dece-
dent's death.
95 For a good practical discussion of the problems pertaining to community prop-
erty during this period, see Transcript of Four Forum Discussions ("Estates, Wills





With respect to the gift tax, the 1948 changes in the law were
simply made by providing" that Section 1000(d) of the Code,
added in the 1942 Act to provide for the taxation of gifts of com-
munity property to the husband unless they were shown to be
derived from the separate property or earnings of the wife, should
be applicable only to gifts made after the calendar year 1942,
when the 1942 gift tax provisions first became effective, and on
or before the effective date of the 1948 Act, April 2, 1948. The
gifts taxable during such period are, however, to be included in
the net gifts for preceding calendar years in order to determine
whether, and at what rate, gifts for the current year are to be
taxed. The provisions of Section 1000(d) are not, however, to
apply in determining the extent to which transfers of community
property are transfers by the decedent under the estate tax.
In the case of the estate tax, the provisions for matching non-
community property with community property center about the
"marital deduction."99 This term, contained in a new Subsection
811(e) of the Code, introduces a novel and intricate concept into
the federal estate tax structure. What it does, in substance, is to
enable one spouse to provide that one-half of his or her property,
less certain deductions from the gross estate permitted under Sec-
tion 812(b) in computing the net estate, shall go to the other
spou~se free of estate tax.
In computing this one-half of what is called the "adjusted gross
estate" that may be given to the other spouse free of estate tax,
the deductions from the gross estate to be considered are funeral
expenses, administration expenses, claims against the estate, mort-
gages or other indebtedness against the estate property, and
amounts spent for dependents' support during the settlement of
the estate. The marital deduction is, furthermore, allowed as a
deduction only with respect to property includible in the gross





property acquired by the surviving spouse from the decedent by
purchase for full and adequate consideration during the dece-
dent's lifetime.
In the case of community property which the decedent and
survivirig spouse held as such at any time, a special rule applies.
The following classes of property are deducted from the gross
estate:
(1) Property held at the decedent's death as community prop-
erty.
(2) Property transferred by the decedent during his life, if
it was community property at the time of transfer.
(3) Proceeds of insurance on the decedent's life to the extent
the insurance was purchased out of community property.
(4) Such proportion of the Section 812(b) deductions as the
value of the gross estate, less the three items above, bears
to the total gross estate.
A special rule on the above special rule provides that where
community property was converted into separate property during
1942, or after the date of enactment of the Revenue Act of 1948,
the separate property must be included in the first three categories
listed above. A further refinement provides that where, in the
conversion, the value of the property acquired by the decedent
exceeded the value of that acquired by the surviving spouse, the
decedent's separate property shall be considered as community
for the purpose of the above three categories only with respect
to the same portion of such separate property of the decedent as
the portion which the value (as of such time) of the surviving
spouse is of the value (as of such time) of the separate property
so acquired by the decedent.
A whole network of complicated rules is set forth in the Act
to preclude the marital deduction where the surviving spouse has
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an interest of lesser scope than the surviving spouse generally has
in a community property state such as Texas, that is, essentially
a fee interest. For example, if the surviving spouse has a life
estate or any other form of terminable interest, or if an interest
is or may be obtained from the decedent by anyone other than
the surviving spouse or the estate of the surviving spouse for less
than adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth,
no marital deduction is allowed. The ordinary "common disaster"
clause, if not more than a six-month period is used, does not, how-
ever, result in a denial of the marital deduction.
Further detailed rules are established for dealing with situa-
tions involving the following: interests passing to unidentified per-
sons; interests in unidentified assets; valuation of interests, trusts
or life insurance where the surviving spouse has a power of ap-
pointment; the passing of an interest from the decedent to any
person; the effect of disclaimers and of the optional valuation
provision and the statutory provisions with respect to previously
taxed property; apportionment of tax in cases involving life insur-
ance and powers of appointment; and the gift tax credit.
These provisions, involving in some cases refined questions of
local property law, even to the point of raising a distinction based
on whether the particular state law adheres to the rule in Shelley's
Case, to determine whether the surviving spouse received a fee
interest or merely a life estate with remainder to the survivor's
heirs, completely ignore Mr. Justice Frankfurter's observation in
the Hallock case.. that the "niceties of the art of conveyancing"
have no place in the practical law of taxation.
With respect to the gift tax, in order to match donors of prop-
erty in non-community property states with donors of community
property, the 1948 Act provided1 ' that where a donor, after the
date of enactment of the Act, transfers property to his or her




spouse by gift, one-half of the value of the property is deductible
from the net gifts subject to tax. Under rules similar to those
above discussed with respect to the estate tax, the marital deduc-
tion is denied with respect to gifts of community property or sep-
arate property considered as community property. 'Detailed rules
for the application of the marital deduction with respect to specific
types of interests and particular situations, as in the case of the
estate tax, are also provided. Gifts made by a husband or wife
out of the non-community property may, if both the taxpayers
consent and so desire, be considered as made one-half by each." 2
While the new Act did not forbid the use of the familiar ar-
rangement of a life estate to the spouse with remainder to the
children, it does prevent the marital deduction in such case be-
cause there has been no estate tax at the death of the life bene-
ficiary. The surviving spouse may, however, be given a commer-
cial annuity or be made the beneficiary of a life insurance policy
payable in installments without losing the marital deduction. If
a trust with a life estate provision meets the following require-
ments, the marital deduction is obtained:
1. The surviving spouse must be entitled to all the income
from the trust principal, either for life or, if the trust terminates
at an earlier date, for the duration of the trust.
2. The trust income must be payable to the surviving spouse
annually or more frequently.
3. The surviving spouse must have a power (exercisable alone
and in all events) to appoint the entire corpus free of trust to
himself or his estate. If the power is exercisable by will only,
the trust is not disqualified merely because he also has the power
to invade only part of the corpus during his lifetime.
4. If another person is given a power of appointment with
regard to any part of the corpus, it must be exercisable only in




In the case of life insurance, the marital deduction is similarly
obtained if the proceeds are receivable by the surviving spouse
in annual or more frequent installments. The installments must
commence within one year after the decedent's death, all amounts
payable during the life of the surviving spouse must be payable
only to such spouse, and the surviving spouse must have the
power to appoint all amounts payable after such spouse's death
to the estate of such surviving spouse.
In the case of married couples, the net effect of the 1948 pro-
visions is, for all practical purposes, to double all the estate and
gift tax exemptions and exclusions. Instead of one estate tax
exemption of $60,000, the couple has two totaling $120,000, pro-
vided, in the case of non-community property, that one-half of
the decedent's property is left to the surviving spouse in accord-
ance with the requirements of the marital deduction provisions.
Under the gift tax, the effect of the 1948 Act is to give the couple
a total of $60,000 lifetime exemption instead of $30,000 if, with
respect to non-community property, half of the $60,0.00 is given
by one spouse to the other. In addition, one spouse may in such
case also give the other $6,000 each year without using up any of
the lifetime exemption since $3,000 is tax-free by virtue of the
marital deduction and the other $3,000 falls under the annual
exclusion. One spouse may, by using all of the possibilities, give
the other $6,000 per year, plus $60,000 during the lifetime of the
donor, and then $120,000 more under his will, without being
subject to estate or gift tax. Adding the above, over a ten-year
period, to their combined gifts to third persons-for example,
to two children who would each receive $60,000 over the same
ten-year period-the couple could completely dispose of, without
any estate or gift taxes, an estate of $360,000.
The same possibilities are open to a couple in a community
property state such as Texas, where the property of the couple
consists in whole or in part of community property. In the case
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of community property, the marital deduction does not, of course,
apply; but such deduction is not needed since the community
property is already owned half by each spouse. As the new law
was designed, from the standpoint of the tax cost of dying or
gifting, it makes no difference whether the property is community
or non-community.
In dollars and cents, the estate tax savings at the time of the
husband's death on a $500,000 community property estate, with-
out making any gifts at all, and assuming five per cent adminis-
tration costs at the time of death, would be the difference between
$110,000 before the 1948 Act and $43,000, or approximately
$67,000. Of course, the surviving wife's estate would have to pay
an estate tax later at her death on her one-half of the $500,000;
but if that was also $43,000, there would still be a saving of the
difference between $110,000 and $86,000, or $24,000.
A serious question arises with respect to the use of the marital
deduction in connection with separate property in a community
property state such as Texas, where this income from separate
property is considered as community property. Assume that a
Texas husband gives his wife a substantial amount of separate
property, thereby taking advantage of the provisions of the new
Act with respect to gifts of a non-community property by one
spouse to another. The income from that property continues to
belong half to the husband, since the income is, under Texas
law, community property. Has the husband made a transfer which
falls under Section 811(c) of the Code, since he "retains-the
right to income from the property" and to that extent (one-half)
the property must be included in his taxable estate at his death?
This is only one of the many questions that will arise and must,
in the end, be resolved by the courts.1 3




III. SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE DRAFTSMAN
The preceding discussion brings us to a consideration of some
of the practical problems presented for the draftsman of wills and
trusts which dispose of community property.0 4
In the drafting of trusts involving both community and separate
property, it will generally appear desirable to use the marital
deduction provision with respect to half of the separate property.
As to the other half, a trust with life estate to the surviving spouse
and remainder to the children will still be worthwhile from the
tax-saving standpoint. It would appear desirable to steer away
from trusts with powers of appointment, in light of the fact that
the Congressional committees have indicated their intention to
review the 1942 power-of-appointment provisions with a view
toward changing them. Under the marital deduction provisions, a
life interest to the surviving spouse, coupled with a taxable power
of appointment in such spouse, does not deprive the decedent's
estate of the marital deduction. If the power of appointment pro-
visions of the Code should be changed, however, they may again
upset trust arrangements containing power-of-appointment pro-
visions.
Another problem arose with respect to life insurance proceeds
paid to the decedent spouse's estate where the premiums were
paid from community property after the effective date of the
1948 Act. Would the terms of Section 8 11(g) (1) require the
inclusion of the total proceeds in the decedent's taxable estate
because they are "receivable by the executor" in their entirety
even where the executor is required, as under Texas law, to pay
over one-half of the proceeds to the wife as her community prop-
erty?105 The Treasury has ruled in such a case that only one-half
of the insurance proceeds will be considered "receivable by the
executor."
104 For a study in estate planning in action for community property, see 1947-1948
TAX LECTURES OF BUSINESS AND ESTATE PLANNING COUNCIL, HOUSTON, TEXAS.
105 U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.26.
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While the changes made in the Revenue Act of 1948 with
respect to community property as such are few in number and
relatively simple in application (in fact a great relief from the
complexities and omissions of the 1942 provisions), he would be
a foolhardy soul today who, in drafting a will or trust for a Texas
resident, would stop with the new community property provisions
alone.
If the testator has, or may have at the time of his death, any
separate property, the person charged with drafting his will must
consider in detail the effect of the "marital deduction," not only
with respect to such separate property but also with respect to
the estate as a whole. Failure to do so would make counsel derelict
indeed. With respect to the gift tax, the need for detailed consid-
eration is less acute; but whether the prospective settlor of a trust,
or the donor in the case of a gift, has, or may later obtain, sep-
arate property, consideration should be given to whether the trust
transfer or the gift should be made from community property or
from separate property. And if it is made from the latter, the
further question arises as to the desirability of a prior gift of
separate property from one spouse to the other. Such a gift may
be desired in order to shift the identity of the donor or settlor or
to increase the number of settlors or donors from one to two.
The fact is that in a community property state such as Texas,
it is just as necessary to review all wills and all trusts that can
be amended as it is in the non-community property states. While
the draftsman of wills, trusts and deeds of gift in most non-com-
munity property states, unless his client lives near or has inter-
ests in a community property state, can generally afford to ignore
the provisions of the new 1948 Act with respect to community
property, the draftsman in a community property state must
master and apply all the estate and, gift tax provisions of the new
law, as to both community and non-community property. And
master them he must, since his clients may die any day, and some
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of them, in the case of most counsel, will die before the year is
over. Once the client has died, the will cannot, of course, be
changed. The draftsman or reviewer of a trust who finds that the
instrument is irrevocable will also discover that under the new
Act no opportunity for amendment of such a trust is afforded.
A somewhat parallel situation existed when the severe 1942
estate tax provisions with respect to powers of appointment were
enacted. 0 6 Wills could be amended prior to death, but irrevocable
trusts could not. Revocable trusts could be amended; but if they
were not altered to afford protection to the holder of the power
prior to his death, the estate tax attached to the power of appoint-
ment. The gift tax on the releases of taxable power 0 7 has, how-
ever, been repeatedly postponed through the annual enactment
of legislation granting successive postponements for the release
of taxable powers of appointment. It now appears likely that fur-
ther postponements will be granted until the power-of-appointment
provisions of the Code have been considered in their entirety by
Congress.
In the case of the 1948 Act, however, it appears clear that coun-
sel responsible for informing testators and settlors of the impact
of the new estate and gift tax provisions on their wills, trusts,
gifting programs and estate plans in general have not only a
heavy but also an immediate, continuing responsibility. In many
cases it will prove no satisfactory answer to a widow or heirs, or
to a widower, that the only reason why necessary or desirable
changes were not made prior to the decedent's death was that the
provisions of the 1948 law'were complicated and difficult to under-
stand. Counsel are paid to know the law. Knowledge and under-
standing of the new provisions cannot, moreover, be lassed off
by the general practitioner as a problem to be left to tax experts.
Even if the drafting of the instruments or the consideration of
the estate plans in general is delegated to such experts by the
106 § 811(f) of the Code.
107 § 1000(c) of the Code.
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general practitioner, the latter has the definite responsibility of
protecting his client to the extent, first, of advising him of the
necessity of reviewing his will or trusts which the lawyer either
drafted or at least knows exist, and, second, of either revising
the instruments as necessary or having the job correctly done by
an expert to whom that duty is assigned. The responsibility for
seeing that the job is done, and as soon as possible, certainly
belongs, however, to the general practitioner rather than to the
expert.
A client, particularly if a considerable period of time has
elapsed since the drafting of the will or trusts in question, may
feel at first that his counsel is "making work" for himself; but it
certainly is the duty of the counsel to disillusion his client in that
respect. Any original resentment by such a client is bound to be
dispelled, in most cases, when he finds the extent of the tax saving
which is generally involved in a reconsideration of his will or his
trusts.
IV. SOME PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR THE HANDLING OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
To avoid difficulty and litigation in connection with the dis-
position of community property, it is important that every owner
of community property be encouraged, by counsel or otherwise,
to adopt a pattern in the handling of such property which will
simplify the, at best, difficult problem of identification thereof in
relation to separate property.
Some of the practical steps to facilitate this and which will
always pay off handsome dividends at some certain date are the
following:
A. Maintenance of Records: Keep records to show just what is
community and what is separate property; the source of property
used for new acquisitions; the income from each class of property
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and its disposition; and the proportions of each piece of property
that are community and separate property.
B. Keep Separate and Community Property Apart: Keep sep-
arate property physically apart from community property when
possible. Use a separate bank account for separate funds; do not
put them in a joint account. Separate safe deposit boxes may be
useful in maintaining the separate character of securities.
C. Pay Insurance Premiums from Proper Fund: If the bene-
ficiary of the irsured's life policy is not the other spouse, pay
insurance premiums from separate funds.
D. Execute Formal Agreements: Execute agreements between
spouses with all the formalities prescribed by law (not over-
looking statutes other than the community property laws, e.g.,
statutes on conveyancing and recording.)
E. Consider Gift Tax Liability: Remember that gift tax lia-
bility may arise from an agreement by spouses fixing their rights
in community property.
F. Watch Credit Extensions: Is it safe to extend credit to one
spouse without imposing liability on the other? For example,
can community property standing in the name of one spouse be
reached to satisfy a community debt incurred by the other?
G. Review Estate Plans: Examine wills, estate plans and in-
surance holdings in the light of the new law.'08 Consider the impact
of federal and state estate taxes.
108 The Professional Ethics Committee of the American Bar Association says: "It is
our opinion that where the lawyer has no reason to believe that he has been supplanted
by another lawyer, it is not only his right, but it might even be his duty to advise his
client of any change of fact or law which might defeat the client's testamentary pur-




A large awareness of the nature of the community property
system and its important relationship to the federal tax structure,
income, gift and estate, is essential to the orderly disposition of
community property. With such knowledge, an effective disposi-
tion can be made of such property in accord with the intent of
both parties to the community estate, man and wife. Without it,
only confusion and expensive litigation in the probate as well as
the tax courts can result.
.The complexity of the community property system is summar-
ized in the paradox that "community is a partnership which
begins only at its end," that is, upon dissolution of the marriage.
The Revenue Act of 1948 is the source, but not the beginning
or the end, of the realistic impact of the federal tax structure on
community property.
A hint to the wise is sufficient - or should be!
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